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Jury Selection and the Death Penalty:
Witherspoon in the Lower Courts
A common device used to amuse, or at least to occupy, children at
birthday parties is a game called "telephone." A child at
one end of the table whispers a story to the person sitting next to
him; that person whispers the story to his neighbor and so on around
the table. The last person to hear the story must recite it aloud. Fre-
quently, what the last person describes bears little or no resemblance
to the original story.
While Supreme Court decisions may be far removed from chil-
dren's stories, Court holdings frequently undergo the same type of
mystifying transformation between the time of their initial pro-
nouncement and their application in lower federal and state courts.
The lower court developments following the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Witherspoon v. Illinois1 provide a microcosm of the gen-
eral process.
The Witherspoon case involved an Illinois court procedure which
allowed exclusion for cause of any prospective juror who expressed
objections to the death penalty. Forty-seven veniremen had been re-
jected because of their general views on the death penalty, although
only five had explicitly stated that "under no circumstances would
they vote to impose capital punishment." The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the jury so selected was not impartial in its role of de-
termining punishment within the meaning of the sixth and four-
teenth amendments, 2 but rather constituted "a tribunal organized
to return a verdict of death."3 The Court therefore voided the death
sentence, but did not overturn the conviction.
1 591 U.S. 510 (1968).
2 Id. at 514.
8 Id. at 521. Some jurisdictions have distinguished their cases from Witherspoon by
arguing that their statutes, unlike that of Illinois, allowed challenges only when the
venireman's scruples against capital punishment would have prevented him from
reaching a verdict of guilty. Howard v. State, 84 Nev. 599, 602-8, 446 P.2d 163, 165
(1968); Walker v. State, - Nev. -, 455 P.2d 34, 36 (1969); Duisen v. State, 441 S.W.2d
688, 692 (Mo. 1969). Another court avoided Witherspoon by finding that the jurors
were dismissed pursuant to a common law authority to dismiss for bias. State v. Pare,
80 N.M. 364, 368, 456 P.2d 197, 201 (1969). Both arguments are unsupported by Wither.
spoon which does not differentiate along these lines. Further, the Illinois statute in-
volved in Witherspoon, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 88, § 743 (1959), had been excluded in the
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For a number of reasons the Witherspoon ruling was ideally suited
for clear and consistent implementation by the lower courts. First,
despite the retroactive nature of the decision 4 the number of cases
to which it applies is relatively small. The ruling does not affect
cases where jury trial is*waived 5 or where the judge determines the
sentence.6 Moreover, the declining availability and use of the death
penalty narrows the decision's scope.7 Thus, while the Witherspoon
rule is extremely important in cases already decided, and will con-
tinue to remain important as long as any defendant is subject to
the death penalty, the courts in applying Witherspoon are operat-
ing in a small, well-defined area.
Second, the ruling deals with an issue, the death penalty, for which
most of the population no longer has much sympathy.8 As a result,
the popular pressures the courts may have felt in implementing
highly controversial Supreme Court decisions, like the Miranda rul-
general revision of the Criminal Code which became effective on January 1, 1964. In
People v. Hobbs, 85 Ill. 2d 263, 220 N.E.2d 469 (1966), the Illinois Supreme Court up-
held the government's challenge of "scrupled" jurors for cause under the new statute,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(d) (1965), which did not specifically allow such a chal-
lenge, and also embraced the "overwhelming weight of authority" which favored such
a result even in the absence of statutory authority. People v. Hobbs, 35 Ill. 2d 263, 274,
220 N.E.2d 469, 475 (1966). Thus, while the Court in Witherspoon was dealing with
a case arising under the older statute, it recognized that challenge for "scruples" was
part of the judicial gloss on the newer statute, and it may even have been considering
the legal principles which are generally advanced in allowing such challenges. If With-
erspoon was meant to be a consideration of the general principles, then distinctions
among various forms of statutes and common law rules should not be decisive in the
application of Witherspoon.
4 Witherspoon was given fully retroactive application by the Supreme Court. Id. at
523 n.22.
5 See People v. Aikens, 70 Cal. 2d 369, 377, 450 P.2d 258, 263, 74 Cal. Rptr. 882, 887
(1969).
6 391 U.S. 510, 517-8 (1968).
7 See generally Jones, The Decline and Fall of the Death Penalty in the English-
Speaking World, in THE PENALTY is DEATH 244 (B. Jones ed. 1968). The number of
prisoners executed in the United States has decreased markedly from 1930, when 155
were executed, to 1967, when two were executed. BUREAu oF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, EXECUTIONS 1930-1967, Table 1, at 7 (No. 42, June 1968).
This decrease reflects the growing disenchantment of the public with the death penalty.
See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 891 U.S. 510, 520 n.16 (1968), and a Louis Harris survey
which showed 47% opposed to the death penalty and 38% in favor. Washington Post,
July 3, 1966, § E, at 3. The trend is reflected in the growing number of states which have
abolished or restricted the death penalty. See, e.g., statutes cited at 391 U.S. 527 n.7. See
also H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATIrrrUDEs TowARDs CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5-24 (1968)
for various statistics, including Gallup poll results, concerning public opinion and the
death penalty.
8 See note 7 supra.
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ings on police procedure9 or the elimination of prayers or Bible
reading from public schools,10 do not exist here.
Finally, implementation of the Witherspoon rule does not depend
on the actions of non-judicial agencies. Whereas the day-to-day ad-
ministration of the Miranda rule depended in large measure on the
cooperation of the police, the Witherspoon decision operates in an
area, the voir dire examination, which is completely subject to ju-
dicial control. One would expect the Supreme Court to have more
influence and control in dealing with judicial bodies than with non-
judicial agencies.
However, despite all the factors favoring consistent application of
Witherspoon, the decision has been often misapplied and occasionally
ignored. The major part of this comment will present and analyze
the conflicting interpretations the lower courts have given the With-
erspoon decision. The comment will then briefly examine evidence
relating to a question that was left open in Witherspoon-whether
the exclusion of capital punishment objectors biases a jury in its role
of determining guilt.
I. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
The Supreme Court established a "general objections test" for ex-
clusion of a venireman because of his position on the issue of cap-
ital punishment:
Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death cannot be car-
ried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was
chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because
they voiced general objections to the death penalty or ex-
pressed conscientious or religious scruples against its inflic-
tion .... 11
From this general standard the Court carved out a "two-prong excep-
tion":
We repeat, however, that nothing we say today bears upon
the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to
death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were
in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistak-
9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966). Some of the problems in the implementa-
tion of Miranda are discussed in Comment, Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogations:
Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CH!. L. REv. 413 (1969).
10 E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and the cases which it spawned.
11 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-2 (1968).
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ably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any
evidence that might be developed at the time of the case
before them or, (2) that their attitude toward the death pen-
alty would prevent them from making an impartial decision
as to defendant's guilt.'2
The general objections test and the two-prong exception should be
read together as the "joint standard" of Witherspoon, the thrust of
which is to provide a jury impartial in fact. A good faith effort by
the court to provide such a jury is insufficient; exclusion for cause
is permitted only where the juror's beliefs are made unmistakably
clear, and where those beliefs would either compel the juror auto-
matically to vote against the imposition of capital punishment or
prevent him from making an impartial determination of guilt.
The need for a clear and unmistakable statement expressing in-
ability to vote for the death penalty was reaffirmed by the Court in
Boulden v. Holman.3 Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
stated that on the basis of the record, it appeared that jurors who
had expressed merely a "fixed opinion" against capital punishment
or did not "believe in" capital punishment had been improperly
dismissed:
Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he would
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punish-
ment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply can-
not be assumed that that is his position. 4
Determining that the voir dire testimony before it did not provide
sufficient information to allow categorization of the degree of oppo-
sition to the death penalty, the Court remanded the case to the dis-
trict court, apparently for further scrutiny of the record 5
The Court's standard can perhaps be best illustrated by reference
to a rough classification of the spectrum of opinions which reflect
conscientious or religious scruples against the death penalty:
12 Id. at 522 n.21. The second, or impartiality prong of the test is merely a restatement
of the general law which allows a juror who is not impartial to be challenged for
cause, and it will not be discussed.
3. 394 US. 478 (1969). Although the petitioner did not make the Witherspoon argu-
ment in the lower courts or in his petition for certiorari, he raised it in his brief and
oral argument.
14 Id. at 482, quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510, 516 n.9 (1968).
15 "A further hearing directed to the issue might conceivably modify in some fashion
the conclusion so strongly suggested by the record now before us." Id. at 484. The
Court's most recent statement of the Witherspoon test is Maxwell v. Bishop, 90 S. Ct.
1578 (1970), in which the Court restates its holding in Boulden v. Holman.
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1. If I were a juror on a murder case, I would vote for the
death penalty only very reluctantly, if there were no
mitigating circumstances.
2. If I were a juror on a murder case, I would vote for the
death penalty only if it were a horrible murder and a
most terrible murderer.
3. If I were a juror on a murder case, I would never under
any circumstances vote for the death penalty, no matter
how horrible the crime. 16
All three jurors may be said to hold "conscientious or religious
scruples" against the infliction of the death penalty. Jurors shown to
have such scruples, without more, are protected by the Witherspoon
holding. But the last juror, who would automatically vote against
the death penalty, could be challenged under the two-prong excep-
tion.
II. APPLYING THE STANDARD
The federal court decisions interpreting Witherspoon have consis-
tently applied the joint standard announced by the Supreme Court
and have insisted on an unambiguous showing that an excluded ju-
ror would automatically have voted against the death penalty. In
Spencer v. Beto,'7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, revers-
ing the death sentence handed down by a Texas district court, quoted
both parts of the joint standard.'8 While conceding that the dismissed
veniremen may have had "very strong scruples"'19 against the death
penalty, the court of appeals held that this degree of opposition to
the death penalty alone was not sufficient to sustain the dismissal of
the jurors in question for cause.20 The same tests were applied in two
other cases reviewed by the Fifth Circuit.
21
The Ninth Circuit, in Sims v. Eyman,2 2 concluded, after examin-
16 H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTUDEs TowAnus CArrTL PUNISHMENT 8 (1968).
17 398 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1968).
18 Id. at 502.
19 Id. at 502 n.3.
20 Id.
21 In Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968), 33 veniremen were excluded
when they answered "yes" to the question: "Are you conscientiously opposed to capital
punishment?" Id. at 805 n.25. The court stated that exclusion of these veniremen for
... .merely assert[ing] conscientious scruples against capital punishment" did not
comport with the Witherspoon standard. Id. at 805. In Irving v. Breazeale, 400 F.2d
231 (5th Cir. 1968), the record did not contain the jury selection proceedings. The case
was remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Missis.
sippi with instructions to enter orders appropriate to allow the state court to deter-
mine whether the principles of the Witherspoon decision were violated. Id. at 236.
22 405 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1969).
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ing the record, that the requirements of the two-prong exception had
been sufficiently satisfied to justify exclusion for cause of four jurors
who stated that they could not vote for the death penalty "regardless
of the circumstances" or "regardless of what the facts of the case are"23
and one juror who stated that because of his attitude toward the
death penalty he "could not sit fairly and impartially." 24 The Ninth
Circuit again construed the two-prong exception in the dicta of Sims
v. United States,25 which was remanded for a new trial on a different
issue. Noting that the Witherspoon issue might arise on remand, the
court suggested that a prosecutor could ask "whether a juror under
no circumstances would consider bringing in a death penalty ver-
dict. '26 A positive response to this question would be sufficient to
establish that a juror could never impose the death penalty, and
would justify exclusion for cause.27
In Segura v. Patterson,28 the Tenth Circuit upheld the death sen-
tence of a man convicted of the first degree murder of his son in
Colorado. The court interpreted Witherspoon as forbidding the ex-
clusion of any juror because of his views about the death penalty
unless he is "unwilling even to consider all of the penalties provided
by state law" and "irrevocably committed to vote against the death
penalty regardless of the facts of any particular case." 29 The court
affirmed the sentence after finding that the veniremen's answers ful-
filled the Witherspoon requirements."
Many states have followed the lead of the federal courts in apply-
ing the proper standard enunciated in Witherspoon.31 For example,
23 Id. at 447.
24 Id.
25 405 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1968).
26 Id. at 1384 n.5.
27 The Sims court also noted that the defendant should be allowed to ask the re-
verse question, "whether under all circumstances a juror feels compelled to return a
death penalty verdict when he finds a defendant guilty of first degree murder." Id.
28 402 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1968).
29 Id. at 251.
30 Id. at 252. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the death sentence handed down by an-
other Colorado court in Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968). There, it cited
its interpretation of Witherspoon in Segura approvingly, and applied that standard.
Id. at 397. For a discussion of the court's interpretation of the effect of an error by
the trial court in the application of the appropriate standard see text at notes 102-7
infra. Similarly, the federal district courts generally apply the combined test. In Wood-
ward v. Maxwell, 303 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Ohio 1969), the court applied the two-prong
and general objections test to reverse a death sentence where the testimony of one dis-
missed venireman was not cear and another would have voted for the death penalty
"in the proper case." Id. at 694-5.
81 California: In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 617-9, 447 P.2d 117, 120-1, 73 Cal. Rptr.
21, 24-25 (1968); Florida: Wilson v. State, 225 So. 2d 321, 326-7 (Fla. 1969); Georgia:
[Vol. 37:759
Jury Selection and the Death Penalty
the California Supreme Court has applied the joint standard consis-
tently, emphasizing that it must be "unmistakably clear" that one of
the two criteria of the two-prong exception has been satisfied in or-
der for exclusion to be justified.32 Chief Justice Traynor, ordering
a new penalty trial for the appellant in People v. Chacon,33 based his
decision on the grounds that several jurors were excluded before they
had made it "unmistakably clear" that they would "automatically"
refuse to vote for imposition of the death penalty.34 In People v. Ri-
senhoover,35 the California Supreme Court again indicated its desire
to eliminate ambiguity by reversing a death penalty because a venire-
man was excused on the basis of "partial answers" which fell short
of demonstrating unmistakable clarity as to his position.36
While the federal courts and many state courts have given a rea-
sonably literal interpretation to the Court's language, some courts
have departed from the strict wording of the decision and, in the
process, have modified and even ignored the apparent intention of
the Supreme Court. The remainder of this section will consider the
four main ways in which some lower courts have narrowed the pro-
tection the Witherspoon standards provide the defendant.
A. The Fair Atmosphere Test
The Illinois Supreme Court, while recognizing the general objec-
tions test and the two-prong exception, has never applied them. It
Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 633-6, 163 S.E.2d 730, 734-6 (1968); Massey v. Smith, 224
Ga. 721, 164 S.E.2d 786 (1968); Whisman v. State, 224 Ga. 793, 164 S.E.2d 719 (1968).
A few Georgia decisions were based solely on the general objections test. Dixon v. State,
224 Ga. 636, 163 S.E2d 737 (1968); Axkwright v. Smith, 224 Ga. 764, 164 S.E.2d 796
(1968); Kentucky: Jaggers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968);
Louisiana: State v. Turner, 253 La. 763, 768, 220 So. 2d 67, 68 (1969); State v. Hudson,
253 La. 992, 1020-2, 221 So. 2d 484, 494-5 (1969); Maryland: Veney v. State, 251 Md.
182, 187-90, 246 A.2d 568, 571-3 (1968); Mississippi: Armstrong v. State, 214 So. 2d 589,
593 (Miss. 1968); New Jersey: State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968) (Wein-
traub, C.J.); North Carolina: State v. Spence, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968); Ohio:
State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St. 2d 167, 248 N.E.2d 605 (1969); Washington: State v. Aiken,
75 Wash. 2d 435, 452 P.2d 232 (1969); State v. Smith, 74 Wash. 2d 744, 779-82, 446
P.2d 571, 592-4 (1969).
32 E.g., In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 617-9, 447 P.2d 117, 120-1, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21,
24-25 (1968).
33 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968).
34 Id. at 772, 447 P.2d at I10, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
35 70 Cal. 2d 39, 447 P.2d 925, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1968).
36 Id. at 55-56, 447 P.2d at 936, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 544. Cf. People v. Durham, 70 Cal.
2d 171, 198, 449 P.2d 198, 216, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 280 (1969). See also People v. Good-
ridge, 70 Cal. 2d 824, 839-41, 452 P.2d 637, 646-7, 76 Cal. Rptr. 421, 430-1 (1969); People
v. Fain, 70 Cal. 2d 588, 601-2, 451 P.2d 65, 72-73, 73 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640-1 (1969); People
v. Bradford, 70 Cal. 2d 333, 345-7, 450 P.2d 46, 52-53, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 732-3 (1969).
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applies instead a kind of "fair atmosphere" test.37 In People v. Speck,38
the first Illinois death sentence after Witherspoon, the Illinois Su-
preme Court accurately summarized the general objections test,39 and
concluded that, while most of the veniremen were questioned ex-
haustively, not all were specifically asked whether they could never
vote for the death sentence.40 Fifty jurors were excused "because they
stated that they had conscientious scruples concerning the death pen-
alty without stating that they would never impose or consider impos-
ing it."41 After Witherspoon, such a finding would seem to require
reversal.4 The Illinois court, however, examined "the atmosphere
of the proceeding,"43 particularly the voir dire, and affirmed Speck's
death sentence on the grounds that
the tone of the proceedings here indicate a sincere desire on
the part of the prosecutor and the court (although perhaps
not shared by the defense), to determine the jurors' qualifi-
cations according to the standard later held acceptable in
Witherspoon.4
Explicitly rejecting the Supreme Court's requirement of an "un-
ambiguous statement" by the venireman that he would automatically
vote against the penalty, the Speck court found that
when the questions and answers are considered in the con-
text of the entire voir dire examination, in which the pro-
spective jurors were informed of the fact that the defendant
was on trial for 8 separate crimes of murder, and in which
they were advised that the State intended to ask that the
death penalty be inflicted, an answer stating that the juror
had scruples against inflicting the death penalty was equiv-
87 The Washington Supreme Court also has emphasized the "atmosphere" of the
courtroom. Unlike Illinois, however, it uses this atmosphere as a background against
which the voir dire is evaluated. State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 435, 452 P.2d 232 (1969);
State v. Adams, - Wash. 2d -, 458 P.2d 558, 575-6 (1969). Kentucky has cited the
"fair atmosphere" test approvingly in dicta. Jaggers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 580,
585 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
38 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968).
39 It stated that the Supreme Court "held that exclusion of jurors simply on the
ground that they had scruples against capital punishment, without further inquiry
to determine whether the juror could vote to inflict a death sentence, deprives a de-
fendant of his right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury." .d. at 208, 242 N.E2d at
225.
40 Id. at 211, 242 N.E.2d at 226.
41 Id. at 213, 242 N.E.2d at 227.
42 See text at notes 35-36.
43 41 Ill. 2d at 211, 242 N.E.2d at 226.
44 Id. at 209, 242 N.E.2d at 225.
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alent to stating that he would not consider its imposition in
the case which was before them.4 5
The court held that Speck's constitutional rights were not violated.46
In two more recent cases, the Supreme Court of Illinois has ex-
tended its "fair atmosphere" approach to deemphasize the significance
of the voir dire examination. In People v. Mallet,47 the court quoted
extensively from Speck in upholding a death sentence where 23 out
of 87 prospective jurors were excluded for cause because of their at-
titudes toward the death penalty. The court at no point looked at
the individual questioning of any venireman. Instead it sought to
establish the "fair atmosphere" of the trial by noting that there was
no examination of veniremen "to see how many could be disqualified
on the statutory basis alone . . . ;"48 that the trial court required in-
dividual examination of jurors and frequent explanation of the three
possible verdicts; and that the defendant was allowed to "constantly
remind"49 the veniremen that they should sign the death sentence
only in a proper case.5"
In a 1969 case, People v. Moore,5' the Illinois court followed the
same reasoning and again refused to reverse a death penalty. Twelve
veniremen were dismissed for cause after they replied affirmatively
to the question: "Do you have any religious or conscientious scru-
ples against the infliction of the death penalty in the proper case?" 52
45 Id. at 212, 242 N.E.2d at 227 (emphasis added). The court seems to be saying at
the same time that the two-prong test does not apply, and that it is met anyway.
We are aware that in Witherspoon the court stated that unless a venireman
states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition
of capital punishment, no matter what the trial might reveal, it cannot be as-
sumed that it is his position. We are of the opinion that the situation here
is so different from that in Witherspoon that the comment of the Supreme
Court is not binding upon us. Witherspoon requires vacation of a death sen-
tence only where jurors are excused because "without more" they say that
they are opposed to capital punishment. (Bumper v. N. Carolina, 391 U.S.
543 . . . .) Here there was much more than a bald statement of opposition
and we do not regard our interpretation of the jurors' responses as an as-
sumption, but a well-founded conclusion based upon the record.
Id. at 212-3, 242 N.E. at 227.
40 The Speck court also relied on the fact that the prosecution had suffident per-
emptory challenges at the end of voir dire to exclude all the jurors in controversy.
Id. at 213-4, 242 N.E.2d at 227-8. See text at notes 105-9 infra.
47 244 N.E.2d 129 (1969). The decision has subsequently been vacated although it
is not dear on what grounds. See People v. Moore, 42 Il1. 2d 73, 84, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969).
48 Id. at 135.
49 Id.
50 The court also noted that the defendant did not challenge a selected juror for
cause and both sides had "ample" peremptory challenges left at the end of voir dire.
See discussion in text at notes 105-9 infra.
51 42 IIl. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969).
52 Id. at 82, 246 N.E.2d at 304-5.
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It appears that this question was all that was asked.53 The court stated
that Witherspoon was distinguishable because in that case the trial
court immediately removed anyone who expressed any doubts at all
about capital punishment.54 The court then quoted a venireman to
show that the court made an effort to select a fair jury55 and quoted
much of Speck to show that the real test is whether, considering the
tone and conduct of the trial, 6 the defendant received a fair trial.
The fair atmosphere test disregards both the language and intent
of Witherspoon.57 The Illinois Supreme Court has ignored the two-
prong test, holding it "not binding" because, in the court's terms,
the circumstances in Speck were different from those in Wither-
spoon5s But the contention that the facts were so different in Speck
that Witherspoon is inapplicable cannot be supported. In both cases
a large number of jurors were dismissed after expressing simply a
general objection to the death penalty. 59 In both cases there was no
attempt to ascertain the content of their objections. Finally, both
cases were tried under exactly the same state procedure.
Since the jurors in Speck, Mallett, and Moore were shown to have
only general, not specific objections, a straightforward application of
the general objections test would have required reversal in all three
cases. The Illinois court in all three cases implied that there was
"'more" than a general objection to the death penalty in the rec-
ord,60 but it looked to the attitude of the trial court as evidence of
this additional specificity. As mentioned previously, Witherspoon re-
quires a jury impartial in fact; the court's good faith effort is irrele-
vant.61 The only "more" acceptable under Witherspoon is further
voir dire testimony making it "unmistakably clear" exactly what the
venireman's position on the death penalty is. While what is consid-
ered unmistakably clear may vary with the circumstances, such a
53 The court continued: "twelve jurors positively asserted that they had such scruples
and were excused for cause without action by the State or objection by the defendant."
Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 82-83, 246 N.E.2d at 305.
56 Id. at 83-84, 246 N.E.2d at 305-6. The court also noted that the State had sufficient
peremptory challenges to have eliminated those prospective jurors eligible to serve
under Witherspoon. Id. at 84, 246 N.E.2d at 306. See text at notes 105-9 infra.
57 Illinois statutory law has been amended to restrict further the effect of Witherspoon.
Any case in which a sentence imposed or recommended by a jury is vacated is remanded
to the trial court for sentencing. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(o) (1969).
58 People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 209, 242 N.E.2d 208, 225 (1968).
59 More jurors were so dismissed in Speck, about fifty, than in Witherspoon, where
about 42 were so dismissed.
60 People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 212, 242 N.E.2d 208, 227 (1968).
61 See text following note 12 supra.
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finding must be made.62 Under the Illinois "fair atmosphere" test,
jurors may presently be dismissed without such an unambiguous
statement.
B. Incorporation of State Law
New Jersey, Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arkansas have
applied a different test in Witherspoon situations-in effect, substi-
tuting pre-Witherspoon state requirements for the Supreme Court's
standard. The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Mathis,63 after
stating the Witherspoon guidelines, 4 reviewed its cases and decided
that "[o]ur cases define cause [for challenge] in terms agreeable to
Witherspoon.""8 The court then examined the voir dire to decide if
the trial court applied the state guidelines accurately, and held that
no jurors had been dismissed in violation of Witherspoon, since the
trial court correctly applied "the concept of cause thus settled by our
cases."160 The court's opinion at no point demonstrated that the New
Jersey standards provided equal or greater protection than the federal
test of Witherspoon.67 Without such a finding the federal, not the
state test should have been applied.
The courts of Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas, and Oklahoma have
adopted the above analysis.0 8 In Pittman v. State,'0 the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals concluded that Texas statutory and case law
"squares with the requirements of Witherspoon"70 and that "[t]he
jury in the case at bar was chosen or selected in the traditional Texas
manner." 71 Applying Texas standards, the court found no error in
the exclusion of three prospective jurors who were "less than ideally
unambiguous as to whether they would vote against capital punish-
ment regardless of the facts or circumstances in any case."'72
62 Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969). See text at notes 14-16 supra.
63 52 NJ. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968).
64 Id. at 242-4, 245 A.2d at 23.
6 Id. at 244, 245 A.2d at 23.
66 Id. at 247, 245 A.2d at 25 (emphasis added).
07 It is, in fact, questionable whether the voir dire of certain jurors passed the
Witherspoon test. Id. at 248-9, 245 A.2d at 26. Cf. State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 290-2,
245 A.2d 181, 195-6 (1968), for similar analysis.
68 See Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968); Koonce v. State,
456 P.2d 549 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1969); cf. Duisen v. State, 441 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1969);
State v. Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d 197 (1969); Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 842, 440 S.V.2d
244 (1969).
69 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968).
70 Id. at 356.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 557.
19701
The University of Chicago Law Review
It has long been the holding of this Court that if it is doubt-
ful whether the juror had conscientious scruples in regard to
the infliction of capital punishment, the court's action in sus-
taining the State's challenge for cause on that ground will be
sustained on appeal.73
This holding conflicts squarely with the Witherspoon requirement
that the juror's disqualification be on "unmistakably clear" grounds.74
In Scott v. State, the court again applied the law of Texas.7 5 It rec-
ognized "that one or more veniremen may have been excused on
challenge for cause without a full showing that they would not in
any case vote for the death penalty ... "76 but affirmed the penalty
because the defense did not examine these men further. The court
assumed that defense counsel did not want the juror anyway or was
satisfied that the Witherspoon test had been met 7
Oklahoma followed a similar approach in Koonce v. State.78 In
comparing Oklahoma law to Witherspoon, the court found the two
compatible.79 The essential question asked by the prosecuting attor-
ney was:
In a case where the law and the evidence warrant, in the
proper case, could you without doing violence to your con-
science agree to a verdict imposing the death penalty?80
Finding that the above question correctly stated the Oklahoma test,81
the court upheld the exclusion of 22 jurors who answered "No."
While this statement may conform with the requirements of Okla-
homa law, it clearly violates Witherspoon. The crucial inquiry is
whether the juror could bring in a death sentence at all, not whether
he could do so "without doing violence to [his] conscience. 's2
In State v. Pace,83 New Mexico applied its own standards, but re-
lated them to those required by Witherspoon. The court maintained
that New Mexico practice had always been consistent with the With-
73 Id. (citations omitted).
74 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
75 434 S.W.2d 678, 680-1 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968).
76 Id. at 683.
77 Id. The court added that the state had not exhausted its peremptory challenges. Id.
See also Whan v. State, 438 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969), where the same
reasoning was used to affirm another death sentence.
78 456 P.2d 549 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1969).
79 Id. at 555.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 515 n.9 (1968).
83 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d 197 (1969).
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erspoon standard,84 and then proceeded to affirm defendant's death
sentence despite a finding that two jurors had been excluded without
a definite determination that they would not subject a man to the
death penalty.8 5
The Supreme Court of Arkansas appears, in Davis v. State,86 not
merely to substitute a state for a federal standard, but almost explic-
itly to reject that federal standard. After quoting its relevant case
law, an 1855 decision87 clearly unrelated to the Witherspoon standard,
the court commented that
[t]o follow appellant's argument to its logical conclusion
would create a kind of anarchy in our system of government
whereby the minority will always hold a veto over any es-
tablished public policy. For instance, since the holding in
Bloom v. Illinois . . . it would be almost impossible to en-
force some provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, if a court
were forced to accept jurors whose private opinions are con-
trary to the policy of the law. For these reasons we find this
point without merit.88
In these jurisdictions the substitution of the state for the federal
standard has resulted in the dismissal of jurors whose attitudes fit
into categories one and two of the bias spectrum discussed above.89
These are jurors whose exclusion Witherspoon prohibits.
C. Harmless Error
Two arguments have arisen in the lower courts which in effect say
that even if the mandates of Witherspoon are clearly not followed in
the trial court, reversal may not be necessary since there may be no
real harm done to the defendant. The first argument centers around
the concept of "systematic exclusion" and the second looks to the
remaining peremptory challenges of the prosecution.
1. The Systematic Exclusion Argument. The Court's opinion in
Witherspoon is ambiguous concerning whether improper jury ex-
clusions may constitute nonreversible error. While some courts find
reversible error if the trial court's standard results in the exclusion
of any jurors in violation of the Witherspoon test,90 some courts have
84 Id. at 868, 456 P.2d at 201.
85 Id. at 367, 456 P.2d at 200.
86 246 Ark. 842, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969).
87 Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568 (1855).
88 440 S.W.2d at 247.
89 See text at note 15 supra.
90 See, e.g., People v. Fain, 70 Cal. 2d 588, 451 P.2d 65, 73 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969);
People v. Bradford, 70 Cal. 2d 333, 450 P.2d 46, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1969). Cf. People
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argued that only the general method of jury selection employed by
the trial court must conform to Witherspoon. A mistake resulting in
the exclusion of an individual juror will not invalidate the entire
jury selection process, since such an error does not amount to the
systematic exclusion of jurors which would destroy the possibility of
a representative panel required by the sixth amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit came very close to
making this argument explicitly in Bell v. Patterson.91 Holding that
Colorado state law was consistent with the general objections test of
Witherspoon, the court stated that the trial court had the correct
test in mind.92 It noted, however, that "the relevant consideration is
whether an examination of the voir dire reveals that the proper test
was in fact applied."9 3 The Bell court found specifically that two
jurors excluded for cause would not automatically have voted against
the death penalty, but did not stop the inquiry there.94 It considered
the voir dire as a whole and affirmed the death sentence based on its
finding that thirteen jurors were properly dismissed and a number
of others were properly included.
It would appear then that the jury did reflect the prevailing
mores of society. It remained neutral in that there was not
the systematic exclusion of any significant element of the
community.95
In Marion v. Beto,96 a federal district court affirmed a death sen-
tence where at least six jurors were excused from the panel for rea-
sons inconsistent with Witherspoon.97 The court's analysis indicated
"that there was no pattern or scheme or plan by the court to exclude,
systematically or otherwise, all jurors who had such scruples."98 In
v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480, 491-6, 450 P.2d 553, 560-3, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168-71 (1969),
where the court went to great pains to determine that one questionable challenge
for cause was proper and to affirm the death penalty.
91 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968).
92 Id. at 398 n.9.
93 Id.
94 Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394, 398 (10th Cir. 1968).
95 Id. at 399. In Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Tex. 1969), the court stated
the proper tests but affirmed the. death._sentence even though it found that three
members of the jury panel were excused "solely because they had conscientious scruples
against the death penalty," id. at 920, and at least three others were excused on the
basis of answers that "imply strongly, if not expressly," id. at 920, that they would not
invoke the death penalty. The court, citing Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Ciro
1969), used a systematic exclusion argument. Id. at 920-1.
96 302 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
97 Id. at 919-21.
98 Id. at 920.
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State v. Mathis,90 and in State v. Adams, 00 the Supreme Courts of
New Jersey and Washington advanced similar systematic exclusion
arguments, and in Pittman v. State,10 the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals cited the argument but apparently was not prepared to base
its holding on it.102
While the "systematic exclusion" argument is not clearly contrary
to the holding of Witherspoon, it does seem to violate the spirit of
the case. Witherspoon attempted to provide significant protection for
criminal defendants facing possible death penalties by insuring that
the jury would be impartial in determining the proper sentence.
The systematic exclusion argument dilutes that protection. The use
of a nebulous standard applicable to the jury selection process as a
whole, rather than to individual jurors, presents a number of diffi-
culties. Not only is it difficult to determine when exclusions become
"systematic," but it also seems possible to find in every case, as the
Tenth Circuit did in Bell v. Patterson,0 3 that some jurors were prop-
erly included and others properly excluded. In Witherspoon itself,
the trial court properly dismissed five of the forty-seven jurors in
question.10 4 Notably, no court using this standard has yet found suf-
ficient exclusion to warrant reversal. Thus, the impact of the system-
atic exclusion argument is to invite the very evil Witherspoon sought
to prevent.
2. The Remaining Peremptory Challenges Argument. A criterion
widely applied to determine if there was reversible error below is
whether the prosecution had peremptory challenges left at the close
of the jury selection. The argument is simply that
it is not unreasonable to assume that the remaining chal-
lenges would have been used had the trial court ruled against
the State on its objection to a specific juror.105
A substantial number of jurisdictions follow this view. 06 In In re
Anderson, however, the California Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument, holding that an assumption that the prosecutor would have
99 52 NJ. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968).
100 - Wash. 2d -, 458 P.2d 558 (1969).
101 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968).
102 Id. at 357.
103 402 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1968).
104 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968).
105 State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 251, 245 A.2d 20, 27 (1968).
106 Texas: Scott v. State, 434 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968); Illinois:
People v. Speck, 41 IM. 2d 177, 213-4, 242 N.E.2d 208, 227-8 (1968); Fifth Circuit:
Spencer v. Beto, 398 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum); Florida: Campbell v. State,
227 So. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. 1969).
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used his peremptory challenges to excuse the jurors in question is
"conjecture" and that reversal is automatic if the Witherspoon tests
have not been met.10 7 The California approach is similar to the doc-
trine that "there are some constitutional rights so basic that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error .... ,"108 In Tumey
v. Ohio,0 9 the Supreme Court declared the right of a defendant to
a disinterested judge to be such a right. It would seem contrary to
the intent of the Court in Witherspoon to hold that the right to an
impartial jury is any less basic or more capable of being "harmlessly"
infringed than the right to a disinterested judge.
D. Waiver
Like the "harmless error" arguments, the doctrine of waiver rep-
resents an attempt to confine Witherspoon through the use of a le-
gal theory not directly passed upon by the Court in deciding the case.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has intimated that a defendant may
waive his Witherspoon rights by failing to question a disputed juror
to determine his attitudes.110 Similarly, in denying a motion for re-
hearing the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals argued that
[w]here as here, several of the venire expressed their convic-
tions against the infliction of the death penalty and appel-
lant's counsel, evidently being satisfied with the veniremen's
statements or because he did not want the veniremen for
some other reason, made no effort to qualify them for ser-
vice we do not conclude that ii. becomes the duty of the
court to take other steps toward attempting to qualify the
veniremen. Veniremen may still be excused by agreement
in this State .... I"
The court further stated that it would apply the two-prong exception
only to veniremen "whom appellant seriously tried to qualify for ser-
107 In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 619-20, 447 P.2d 117, 121-2, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21,
25-26 (1968). Two jurisdictions have noted that the defense had peremptory challenges
left, and built a waiver-of-objections argument based on it: Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d
352, 357 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968); State v. Peele, 274 N.C. 106, 113, 161 S.E.2d 568,
573 (1968). This argument would completely eliminate the protections provided by
Witherspoon. Once prospective jurors with scruples against the death penalty are elimi-
nated from the selection process, it is completely useless for defense counsel to challenge
a juror peremptorily because of his opinion about the death penalty. The method of
selection itself insures that the challenged juror's replacement will not have the feelings
against the death penalty desired by the defense.
108 Chapman v. United States, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
109 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
110 State v. Pare, 80 N.M. 364, 367, 456 P.2d 197, 200 (1969).
111 Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 362 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968).
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vice. ... "112 It found no such intent where the defendant did not
request further interrogation." 3 Thus, the court has shifted the bur-
den of proof from the prosecutor, the party making the motion to
dismiss a juror for cause, to the defendant. Witherspoon does not sup-
port such a shift.
III. REVERSAL OF GUILT DETERMINATION
At present the application of Witherspoon to guilt determinations
is uncertain. While the Court in Witherspoon refused to decide
whether the exclusion of capital punishment objectors biases a jury
in the determination of guilt, it clearly left the door open for later
reconsideration of the issue.
The data adduced by the petitioner, however, are too tenta-
tive and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to
the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the deter-
mination of guilt. We simply cannot conclude, either on the
basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial
notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital pun-
ishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of
guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction. In
light of the presently available information, we are not pre-
pared to announce a per se constitutional rule requiring the
reversal of every conviction returned by a jury selected as
this one was." 4
One of the studies relied on by the petitioner was a preliminary
unpublished one page summary of a study by Professor Hans Zeisel
based on interviews with 1,248 jurors in New York and Chicago. The
study has since been completed." 5 To eliminate the extraneous influ-
ence of the weight of the evidence in the individual case the jurors
were grouped according to the split of the vote on the first ballot (i.e.,
11-1, 10-2, and so on). The statistical comparisons were made within
these groups. The jurors in those groups which were unanimous, for
or against conviction, were eliminated. This left eleven groups and a
total sample of 464. Professor Zeisel has concluded:
First, odds are 24 to I that the statement is true, that jurors
without scruples against the death penalty are more likely
to vote Guilty on the first ballot than jurors who have such
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-8 (1968) (Court's footnote omitted).
115 H. ZEisEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTTUDES TowARDs CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968).
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scruples. Secondly, odds are 4 to 1 that the difference in per-
centage points of Guilty votes will fall somewhere between
4 and 17 percentage points, in the indicated direction.116
This study seems to furnish an empirical basis for concluding that
jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution
in determination of guilt.117 However, while statistically significant,
neither the relationship discerned nor the magnitude of that relation-
ship is overwhelming. When considered together, as they must be
here, the degree of certainty with which a conclusion can be stated
is diminished. Even if the relationship were absolutely certain, the
odds are 4 to 1 that it would only affect one-half to two jurors on
the first ballot. Professors Kalven and Zeisel in their study of the
American Jury conclude that normally it takes at least two dissent-
ing jurors on the first ballot to affect the outcome.'-"
No court has yet reversed a guilt determination solely on the bases
of Witherspoon and the Zeisel study. Before the Witherspoon deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit in Crawford v. Bounds overturned a North
Carolina murder conviction because veniremen conscientiously op-
posed to capital punishment had been excluded from the jury, but
its decision has since been vacated and remanded for further consid-
eration in light of Witherspoon.19 Since Witherspoon two courts
have, due to idiosyncrasies of their law, remanded for a new trial as
to guilt.120 A third jurisdiction has reversed a guilt determination
citing Witherspoon, but it is not clear from the case or the briefs of
the State or defendant why this was done.' 21 While it seems consis-
116 Id. at 32 (author's footnote omitted). The second conclusion means the rela-
tionship found will probably affect between 4% and 17% of the jury, or roughly
1/2 to 2 jurors of a panel of twelve.
117 Probability theory sometimes enables the computation of the percentage of times
a specified chain of events will occur by chance, that is, without identifiable cause.
For example, one can state that the probability a true coin will fall heads-up two times
in a row is 1/2 x M = / = 25%. If a series of events occurs whose probability
is small (any ten times heads-up = 1/410 - lA024 = 'V0 of 1%) the suspicion that
the coin was not true will have considerable support. In similar if more complicated
fashion, one can compute the probability that a pattern as that shown in the Zeisel
study could develop by chance, that is, without there being a systematic relationship
between attitude toward capital punishment and propensity to find a defendant guilty
of a criminal charge. For more detail on the methodology see Finkelstein, The Appli-
cation of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HAv. L. Rv.
338, 338-53 (1966).
118 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462-3 (1966).
119 395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 76 (1968).
120 Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968); State v. Spence,
274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968).
121 State v. Turner, 253 La. 763, 220 So. 2d 67 .(1969). The appropriate argument for
reversal of the guilt determination was simply not made by the defendant.
[Vol. 37:759
Juty Selection and the Death Penalty
tent with common sense that jurors not opposed to the death penalty
would be more likely to vote guilty than those expressing conscien-
tious scruples against capital punishment, it seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court will require reversal of guilt determinations in the
absence of more conclusive evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reasons for the unfaithful implementation of Witherspoon by
the lower courts are certainly open to conjecture. Some of the hos-
tility toward the decision may result from its being made retroactive.
The courts may simply resent reversing the death sentence of a con-
victed killer because the jury was chosen in a manner unconstitu-
tional only in retrospect. This objection would be especially true
in the case of particularly heinous crimes, such as the Speck murder
of seven student nurses, or in situations where the defendant has
already been retried and again found guilty.
It is also possible the rejection of Witherspoon is due to the an-
tipathy of the courts toward recent cases such as Miranda extending
constitutional guarantees. The lack of finality in judicial handling
of serious crimes concerns people. To many it may seem that the
continual reopening of factual and legal determinations places an
intolerable burden on the judicial system. Finally, some courts may
believe simply that Witherspoon was wrong, but may not be as can-
did in acting upon that theory as the Arkansas Supreme Court.122
Whatever the reason, Witherspoon has not been properly imple-
mented. The short history of the decision has been filled with more
misinterpretation than is warranted by the ambiguities of the opinion
itself. It remains to be seen whether the resulting bad law will remain
to distort decisions in less emotional cases in the future and require
another Supreme Court decision to repeat what has already been said
in Witherspoon.
122 See Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 842, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969).
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